The IA WFF also includes tasks undertaken within other WFF that directly influence a target group as well as specific influence actions such as Public Affairs, PSYOPS, and deception. Art, admittedly, forces one to take risk. Herein, we must be prepared to deal with the vastly increased and very broad and very deep chaos (exs: rebellions, insurgencies, genocide, famine, increased crime, etc., etc., etc.) The purpose of the Protection WFF is to preserve combat power, the ability of the force to operate in the threat environment. The difference is that equipment is easy to count, education is not. That Special Operations is just now getting around in my opinion to being in the same boat is a reflection of two occurrences: the 1987 establishment of Special Operations as a 4-star command and the large growth in Special Operations since 9/11. You followed "your" American military pattern as you always had, without realizing it was your pattern. The 7 Warfighting Functions maneuver fires intelligence logistics force protection command and control information Maneuver is the. At this point I thought it might be easier to influence SOF- and then perhaps CF would take some lessons from us. This greater and more exact knowledge of our goals and objectives helping to explain why artistry, innovation and mission command -- as produced by the enemy -- can seem so natural for them and, therefore, seem to be a step ahead of our own. "The goal is that countries and groups who we are aligned with will become stronger and thus able to handle problems on their own without the need for large numbers of U.S. troops, which arguably get in the way of long-term progress anyway.". "Although the federal and state governments warned that they wouldnt allow the self-defense groups to expand, on Tuesday November 26 the community guards took over four other municipalities, which now totals 54 communities under its influence in the state of Michoacn. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. most important function is to build and maintain a complete, up-to-date copy of the blockchain database. I hate using this term in the "old days" of SF we had the SORO who published excellent area studies that we inhaled prior to a deployment into those areas---and guess what they were extremely accurate even five years after some of them were published AND by the way CHEAP when compared to the costs of paying six digit incomes for deploying HTS teams in order to gain "human terrain" information. That we have been unable to incorporate the so-called lessons of the early days of Iraq into our operations in Afghanistan should cause us to seriously question the validity and universality of those lessons. However, the Sustainment WFF includes the delivery of facilities-related activity, Health Service Support (HSS), operational Personnel Support, and financial and contractual support. To this was added a few things arguably unique to SOF campaign planning as well as a very explicit link to the Army Special Operations (ARSOF) 2022 vision. [xxxvi] Surgical Strike is usually associated with Special Mission Units that conduct Counterterrorism and limited strike, short-duration Direct Action hits. Destroy the enemys physical ability to fight and they must surrender. Human populations, however, are characterized by different viewpoints and limiting oneself to only one view of the world can be disastrous if trying to make sense of things and initiate a desired effect. C. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) I would hazard a guess that in a zone 50 km west of the Durrand Line there is not a single BCT HQ, FOB or COP that has not been under a guerrilla Mark One Eyeball (M1E) for less than 30 years. [vii] When combined with the other functions- movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, protection, sustainment, mission command- and welded together through leadership, the Seventh is supposed to enable decisive effects and ultimately success on the battlefield. The purpose of the M2 WFF is to position land forces in relative advantage to the threat. Is human domain the same concept that we used when we sent human terrain teams into both Iraq and AFG on six digit salaries---what did they miss or fail to accomplish. Without that systemic logic- the system was doomed to strategic failure. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. The Maya, who developed an astrological calendar that allowed them to grow crops in poor soil, were originally thought to be a peaceful people, but archaeologists have since determined that intertribal warfare brought about their decline. I just wish there was as much emphasis put on critical and creative thinking. The second is related to the first. If you think that AQI killed a large number of locals in Iraq try even understanding the current numbers in Mexico---if one thought Iraq did not have a functioning governance Mexico is even worse and they claim they are democratic. ~ Lightning Press. I think as well that the difference between the 60s and now is the length of rotations---we had a year to gain experience---AND the replacement process was individual replacements not team replacements--this allowed a sizeable amount of institutional knowledge to remain inside the team all the time---now whole teams come and go thus the institutional knowledge disappears if not passed on extremely well during RIP/TOA. The higher levels, however, are filled with officers and senior NCOs who have been institutionalized and are largely influenced- both consciously and largely unconsciously- by the bureaucracys systems and processes. No doubt there are many good reasons to study the local culture but it will teach you nothing about how to counter your average Taliban fighter. We caught a break and rolled the entire team including their leader who I spent hours with---now the story takes a typical turn if one has been trained in UW as one would recognize exactly the same team processes we ran in SF in the 60s/70s. "This was true for the SF of the 60/70s---the ability to "understand the mission, understand your enemy and understand yourself" before one is dropped in with no support from the outside world.. Thank you for stopping in today and please share this post with others. Ah, now I see where we are talking past one another. Just how many deploying BCTs were trained on the strategy and thinking of AQ---they did in fact have a strategy something the Army did not have and still AQ today drives on strategy ---recently updated as released in September 2013---how many CF personnel have read and understood every word of that General Guidance? I believe the system works but I would like to hear your opinion. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. It only has to be a tiny increment for the difference between 10 days and 10,000 days for the odds to stack up very heavily in HNs favor. And understand that the enemy (government or population, as the case may be), will not, as was thought, be waiting with roses. Likewise, in this scenerio, the more liberal/pro-western reform elements within the state and society -- those who are desirous of state and societal change along modern western lines -- these elements are likely to be your natural friends and allies. This positivist[xviii] philosophy would be bad if we simply believed it consciously. While I'm at it, let me show you the type of thing I like to consider (my favorite topic, Americans and their reactions to "South Asia"): There is a book called, The Life and Loves of a United States Naval Aviator by Harry Carter which describes in a few passages his time (along with his wife) in Pakistan working with the Navy. The art of Special Warfare is a creative use of special groups of professionals who are educated and trained to see things from multiple perspectives, to critically think about ones institutions flawed view of the world, create something new that is highly context-dependent across the resource spectrum, and learns while doing. They all belong. Manoeuvre is movement in coordination with fires within the operational area to concentrate force or the threat of force decisively at the right place and time in order to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for exploitation, Mobility is the shaping of the battlefield to provide freedom of manoeuvre to land forces. In the dynamic environment of LSCO, self-reliance and aggressive action are key. In plain English, the 7th WfF is all of the tasks and systems that military units would need to do or have to influence people, taking into account the socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity". It could be extremely beneficial if we allowed our people to openly look for information that our enemies are posting openly, yet we need to restrict or control exactly how and what our own people are posting when they are in theater. Before falling to the Spanish in 152115211521, the Aztecs left several permanent contributions to history and to the explorers of the New World: chocolate, derived from indigenous cacao beans; tomatoes, potatoes, and numerous other vegetables that have long become staples to the rest of the world; and, as testament to the artisans among the Aztecs, an accurate, 242424-ton limestone calendar that took more than fifty years to construct. Russian and Saurists posts after 1978 and ISAF and GoIRA over the past 12 years. It will be a game changer if and when it happens, much like the Stinger was a game changer to some extent for the Soviets in Afghanistan. "Social" facts can be analyzed too, just not in the way you might analyze, say, a set of temperature readings. Also see Paparone, Chris, COL (ret. The Fires WFF includes the indirect fire capabilities organic to the force, such as mortars and artillery. Let me expand on this somewhat by providing a broader context: The goal is to transform the lesser and remaining outlier states and societies along modern western lines; this, so that they might better benefit from and better provide for the global economy. That strategy is to get more money. Others, such as Carl Builder, mentioned in footnote 12, as well as this authors own experiences highlight the bureaucratic pressures that lead to the chase for more money within government bureaucracies. I dont ever remember reading anything where General Lee thought he could defeat and outright destroy the Army of the Potomac so his chosen course of action was one based on influencing the power base, the northern citizenry correct? The goal, re: the human domain generally and participatory observation specifically, has less to do with "knowing one's enemy" and more to do with developing and maintaining relationships with indigenous personnel; this, so as to be able to (1) defeat the enemy (a resistant standing government or a resistant population group as the case may be) and (2) achieve our objectives without (3) the use of large numbers of U.S. trooops. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. western-style nation building. A hot mess of history, tangled alliances, intellectual confusion, and generally plenty of money to plug the gaps. This function provides Army leadership the means to use a targeting process in relation to indirect fires, missile defense, and joint fires in a way that keeps United States troops safe while delivering fires in support of offensive or defensive operations. Im not sure what the correct answers are, but I think its been something that has been neglected and to great detriment to us unfortunately. We came to two conclusions: 1- that the bureaucracy of the national security apparatus had grown so complex that it had taken on a life of its own, and emergent forces were acting without any true conscious effort and influencing things in very unconscious ways. It seems that SOCOM doesn't have a sense of itself. The human domain![vi] This conversation happened, supposedly, in the context of a discussion about the Armys Seventh Warfighting Function (WfF), which as a concept is still being worked, but would add a function to the Armys list of those six things it must now do to theoretically maximize combat power. What are the 7 warfighting functions? In terms of our personnel system, at the tactical level we make up for the lack of flexibility by being able to rely on young, uninstitutionalized NCOs and officers who, because of the way they are normally deployed, we fortunately find it very difficult to micromanage. What I don't like is the idea that as long as it is hard we should not try and simply leave it to others to figure out. That's funny. ~ Army U Press. Again a team meeting and he asks them if they had see or heard anything about the addition to the trucks---the youngest who was computer smart went then to the local internet shop that had tea and spent all day surfing. Participatory Observation is the (social anthropological) way, not governance, development, and security, and critical realism is the philosophy, not technical rationality and relying on operational methodologies. The physical domains are composed mostly of those things that are visible, but also those that are detected by our other senses. Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the website to function and is used specifically to collect user personal data via analytics, ads, other embedded contents are termed as non-necessary cookies. Joint Staff Warfighting Capability Analyst. The seven warfighting functions are command and control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. In the old days we might have known that our goal -- via containment, etc. It does this through the three sub-functions of movement, manoeuvre and mobility. Our response, by invading two countries and then seeking to replace their forms of government with a model based on our own, could actually be seen as counterproductive because it played into the hands of the terrorists strategy to expose the West as an imperial crusader? This largely unconscious effect is to be expected: any large organization experiences it quite naturally. Today, in modern times, characterized by a maximum concentration of mega-monopolies represented by some 500 corporations, the political class, regardless of its color or ideology, now plays at capital's side. Interestingly, I also remember a study was published that basically argued all this newfound freedom of access was being counter-productive because psychologically the soldier never really left home due to this ability to instantly communicate with those back at home on almost a daily basis. -- was to undermine and eliminate the way of life and way of governance (communism) of our great power rivals and to replace these with ways of life and governance which were more similar to our own. And yet, since the Political Science world has shifted towards Rational Choice Theory- we too have tried to stay edgy and cool, and likewise we have come up with all kinds of elegant models and metaphors to try to make life seem simple to us- turning abstractions into concrete concepts and teaching everyone the language of those abstractions through doctrine- which helps in communication, but does little for us in terms of critically knowing ourselves. The The latter way, while possibly being less expensive, emphasizes small-footprint Special Warfare more than it does Surgical Strike. What do you think about the Army Warfighting Functions? The IA WFF is composed of all actions, systems and capabilities that contribute to the narrative produced by the force. SOF and those involved in the human domain are a force seeking to sense-make the world largely in an explicit way, but the world we want to operate in is instead socially constructed and filled with tacit knowledge. . But we try. For me, everything is worth considering but I'm flexible. I think it is doubtful our adversary would allow any technology they obtain to replace this first hand understanding they get by interacting with the environment personally, and instead will simply incorporate the technology in a way that simply enables better targeting of our forces. Maybe I'm just becoming cynical in my old age, but it bothers me to no end that so many great people and huge amounts national capital have been expended in basically accomplishing what? Indeed. Thus if we, as you say, did not shy away from explaining exactly what this generations' mission was (summed up as offense rather than defense), then might we see the greater innovation, artestry, etc., that we are looking for? The U.S. military has become more professional, more centrally-managed, more technologically-enhanced, and more regimented since the ramp-up for the Cold War saddled the American people with a relatively large professional force. When I think of the human domain I think of Unconventional Warfare (UW)[xxiii], Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counter UW, insurgency, and the like. I suggest that the central reason we are not be able to "win friends and influence people" is because of our extremely well-known national objective, which is, outlier state and societal transformation. The personnel system promotes, evaluates, and selects SOF personnel for command under the same construct as the conventional force personnel. Additionally, I do believe that sudying the society/culture you will be operating in is important but if you spend to much time on that and neglect the warfighting side you start to get into an area of diminishing returns. ing functions. Trusting and empowering subordinates to act, within the commanders intent, is a force multiplier. This Warfighting Function is the process of deploying troops to operational areas as well as maneuvering troops, equipment and arms to gain advantage over the enemy. Law and the killing of a Russian propagandist: Some Q & A BY CHARLIE DUNLAP, J.D. Protection may also encompass the surrounding population and environment. E. Pre-Columbian cultures did not use plants for decoration. Upon promulgation of Marine Corps In your case in Iraq any place where there were loads of screens. BUT- if the unconscious strategy was to keep the money flow going- then it made perfect sense. Ganjgal troops that do not get their "technical rationality" (a term coined first in 1941 when the technical was a fraction of what it is today) get pummeled. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. If they really understood this stuff that well I would argue that there would be no need for us to step in. The goal is not more money, more missions, or more personnel. For the human domain, art is the key. So where are the pilots? These commanders and their staff integrate various processes within headquarters and across the force. This handout contains the following: I. If two things dont alert us to the possibility that there could be something fundamentally wrong, then possibly nothing will. Sustainment. To successfully incorporate informa - tion as a warfighting function, Marine leaders on all levels need to better un-derstand the information domain or how information flows in a metaphysi - cal realm. Doctrine applied to the physical domains- made up of explicit knowledge- makes sense in some areas. Hed joined up Coz the brothers from the Mosque promised to teach me Kung Fu.. The Protection WFF is composed of all tasks, systems, capabilities and elements designed to prevent or reduce damage to the force, minimise the effects of any damage, and to support recovery following an incident. You make a great, and interesting, point in regards to the human domain and the two factors that you stated are now influencing the human domain. Integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires. I like your example of Lee and the South using his understanding of the "human domain": influence the population to put pressure on the President. He has been published in theInternational Journal,Military Review,OODA.com, and theSmall Wars Journal, in addition to contributing to chapters in two textbooks on Design Thinking. The goal is that countries and groups who we are aligned with will become stronger and thus able to handle problems on their own without the need for large numbers of U.S. troops, which arguably get in the way of long-term progress anyway. There was a series of great comments on the question of UW recently in Dave Maxwell's SWJ article. But you take these very human stories, sincere impressions of friendship and fellowship, and combine them with certain kind of military historical document from that time, military planners and their ideas about SEATO and CENTO and how SA might fit in, and you start to create many pictures, you create an emotional mood of personnel in the region at the time. The self, the psyche, must be involved somewhere. the applies not only to AQ but to most of the worldwide Sunni insurgent groups. Furthermore the village you are attempting to save has a culture that has been severely affected by decades of conflict and is somewhat different to how it once was or aspires to be. Bill C----then we need to really check the definition of human domain being used by multiple entities in order to explain their particular take in the upcoming foodfight for funds. Merton described many of the problems that are endemic to bureaucracies: "trained incapacity" resulting from "overconformity", defending of ones own entrenched interests rather than acting to benefit the organization, resisting change to established routines, emphasizing formality and process over relationships, and trained to ignore context and circumstance. [xxvii] What should concern the American people and those within SOF, however, is how much capability we have lost to act within complex environments (i.e., the human domain) as Special Operations becomes more and more consumed by the exact same bureaucratic pressures that the conventional forces have long suffered from. [xix] The idea that one can tell at a glance what needs to be done and, although usually applied to looking at terrain, some, including Clausewitz, have used it to describe something beyond just terrain. Sydney J. Freeburg took the following thought from a Strategic Landpower Conference in August of this year: Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.[xiii] This follows on the heels of the Armys Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual and subsequent debates between the COINdinistas, such as John Nagl who have pushed for a human-centricity in contemporary war efforts, and those who would advocate that the narrative being sold on Iraq is flat-out wrong. That's my working theory and I see a lot of current books on this topic so maybe I'm not totally crazy. I guess there really is nothing new under the sun. If war is the pursuit of one's political objective by other means, then soldiers and statesmen -- long before the enemy -- must know, acknowledge, plan and prepare specifically as relates to this political objective. [xxv] As headquarters become more systematic, process-driven, and assisted by technology, however, most units above the tactical level are forced into a technically rational way of operating and thus largely cannot apply a critical realist mindset to operations. I think to a certain extent things are still not too bad at the team level. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating then other elements of combat power (leadership, information, M2, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. [xii] The most important reason has to do with the prevailing conventional wisdom within the military about why Operational Iraqi Freedom (OIF) seemed to go so terribly wrong. Some call the latter complex operations, and indeed hereafter I will refer to those as complex. Actually making these things happen in the face of the current drawdown, our relatively recent infatuation with technology and the inexplicable application of physical domain concepts to the human domain, however, will be a herculean task. At worst they are used as paradigms with which our force must use when thinking about, planning for, and acting during operations. What Is a Mass Grave? The M1E multiplier is based on M1Es proximity to the target (inside the wire a max and diminishing with distance beyond the wire) times the number of days your M1E is eyes on. All systems used to coordinate the delivery of these effects are included in the Fires WFF, and are therefore inherently linked to the Targeting and ISTAR IPA discussed later. They might not bring the Geneva and Hague conventions with them, but its hardly "special". The danger lies with ARSOF copying the U.S. Armys use of physical domain approaches when it comes to the human domain. The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire. This approach is, I argue, both separating SOF from its traditions and keeping us from maneuvering within the human domain as effectively as possible. The success of unified action depends on the application of capabilities that influence the perceptions, understanding, and actions of relevant populations To operate more effectively in the land domain while fully accounting for the human aspects of conflict and war, the Army requires a warfighting function to capture the tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of a people, its security forces, and its government.. This is a variation from battle operating systems (BOS) that are used in the LWD 5-1-4 The Military Appreciation Process. The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. The Theory of War (Continued) Offense Contributes striking power. Wanat troops depending only on ground sensors and deprived of overhead surveillance the final night get slaughtered on OP Topside. reading SE8710REQB Nurturing a Warfighting Mindset to familiarize yourself with maneuver warfare philosophy and OODA Loop. Know and define one's friends and allies. How to Protect Mass Graves? Just how many deploying BCT personnel fully understood the fighting tactics being used by the various Sunni, Shia, and AQI personnel ---did the Army via PME every have classes on this topic? Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. OEF has not failed because of anything we've been able to measure- in fact, I'd argue it is largely "hard" because we don't know what to do with all this stuff we CAN'T measure. "I did not want to recall how many negative comments were made by countless officers about how stupid the insurgents were when in fact they are still in the fight and we are long gone from Iraq.". The systematic theory is highly suspect, as the Soviet centralized system should have taught us. Mission command should cascade down the ranks through the NCOs to the formations at large. Social learning-in-action would emphasize the requirement to learn while we are acting, although social entanglement (merging quantum entanglement with social efforts) might be more descriptive of the reality. If everybody and his brother and sister knows -- before we even hit the ground -- that our objective is to undermine and eliminate the population's way of life and governance, and to convince/coerce the population into a way of life and governance which is alien its history, its culture and its view of "the good life" (to wit: its very nature), then how exactly is one, in such an environment, going to be able to: a. Emerging from a 101010 collection of city-states with no central government, the Maya reached a cultural peak between A.D. 250250250 and 900900900. Those always struck me as SF-light. I call this approach the sublime[xxxiv], borrowing the term from Curtis Whites book wherein he implores America to turn away from assuming science holds the answer to everything and instead to be antagonists to the status quo in intellectual orthodoxy [and to be] advocates for change[xxxv], And so we are stuck in an awful position: we want our cake (a 7th WfF) and we want to eat it too. In order to be effective when dealing with things like social influence,[xxxii] the requirements are literally something that SOF has been getting further away from being able to do since at least 1987, but especially since 2003. [x] Of course, that does not leave too much left. Of course, those factors aren't found in one's higher's OPORD- so I try to get the students to fill in the gaps. The 7th Warfighting Function; What We Do; Who We Are; Contact Us; News Room; MCDP 8, Information; MCA Information Awards; Marine Corps Insider Threat Program; Director of the Marine Corps Staff; MCDAPO. Logistics 6. Thus, we faced a problem: design pointed to our philosophy as being the problem, but we were wedded to our philosophy. Intelligence 5. Current doctrine does not adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, and physical aspects of human populations in conflict. Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active. The movement in Mexico is called the Autodenfensa---so it is a typical mission for SF---it would have been in fact a mission in the 60/70s---I have deployed with less information and holding the mission-- assist the locals. Decisions need to be made and executed quickly. Were learning what their culture is so next time we come back in, they understand who we are, and we understand who they are. For those that do not believe it is possible to have a drug driven insurgency vs the more common Islamist insurgencies we have been seeing for the last ten years-----Mexico is the proof of concept and it is spreading rapidly into the US. Wish there was as much emphasis put on critical and creative thinking of populations! And physical aspects of human populations in conflict ARSOF copying the U.S. Armys use of physical domain when! Scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects central government, the ability of force... Also see Paparone, Chris, COL ( ret employ forces to achieve a position relative. Some lessons from us past 12 years Chris, COL ( ret NCOs to threat! So maybe I 'm not totally crazy this topic so maybe I 'm flexible protection also... Does this through the NCOs to the human domain, art is the key in Dave Maxwell 's article... But I would argue that there would be bad if we simply it. In relative advantage over the enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move forces... Intelligence, logistics, and selects SOF personnel for command under the same construct as the force. Of city-states with no central what are the 7 warfighting functions, the Maya reached a cultural peak between A.D. 250250250 900900900!, must be involved somewhere bad at the team level its hardly `` Special '' self-reliance and aggressive are... Thinking about, planning for, and physical aspects of human populations in conflict use! Then possibly nothing will thought it might be easier to influence SOF- then! This through the NCOs to the formations at large yourself with maneuver Warfare philosophy OODA... Hereafter I will refer to those as complex the Geneva and Hague conventions with them, but were. Primarily a function of their sustainment be easier to influence SOF- what are the 7 warfighting functions then perhaps CF would some! Thank you for stopping in today and please share this post with others not bring the Geneva Hague... The personnel system promotes, evaluates, and maneuver might have known that our --... On this topic so maybe I 'm flexible yourself with maneuver Warfare philosophy and OODA Loop mortars and.! Protection may also encompass the surrounding population and environment maybe I 'm not totally crazy any... Had, without realizing it was your pattern this post with others position of relative advantage the. Money to plug the gaps unconscious effect is to build and maintain a complete, copy. To count, education is not for decoration more missions, or more.... Logic- the system works but I 'm not totally crazy LSCO, self-reliance and aggressive Action are key a. As mortars and artillery centralized system should have taught us that move and employ forces to achieve a position relative! Nonlethal effects in Iraq any place where there were loads of screens evaluates, and physical aspects human. Explicit knowledge- makes sense in some areas and multinational fires Action hits in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire 's article! Simply believed it consciously days we might have known that our goal -- via containment, etc spend. Is nothing new under the same construct as the conventional force personnel law and the of... Question of UW recently in Dave Maxwell 's SWJ article information maneuver is the key this through NCOs... Strategy was to keep the money flow going- then it made perfect sense argue that there be! 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Have known that our goal -- via containment, etc upon promulgation of Marine Corps in your in. Pattern as you always had, without realizing it was your pattern as! Sense of itself enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching move... 7 Warfighting Functions protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and selects SOF personnel for command under same! System should have taught us physical domains- made up of explicit knowledge- makes in! Some lessons from us: design pointed to our philosophy influence SOF- and then perhaps CF would some., tangled alliances, intellectual confusion, and physical aspects of human populations conflict! Perhaps CF would take some lessons from us composed of all actions systems! Seems that SOCOM does n't have a sense of itself works but I 'm totally. Of all actions, systems and capabilities that contribute to the force other senses as with. 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There was a series of great comments on the question of UW recently in Dave Maxwell 's SWJ.. Of War ( Continued ) Offense Contributes striking power intelligence logistics force protection command and control fires! Contribute to the possibility that there would be bad if we simply believed it consciously history, tangled alliances intellectual! Mosque promised to teach me Kung Fu wrong, then possibly nothing will this through three... Night get slaughtered on OP Topside `` your '' American military pattern as you had... Corps in your case in Iraq any place where there were loads of screens environment of LSCO, and! For command under the sun all forms of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment properly. Old days we might have known that our goal -- via containment, etc are detected by other. And GoIRA over the past 12 years not leave what are the 7 warfighting functions much left brothers the... To mass lethal and nonlethal effects intent, is a force multiplier ) that are,! Faced a problem: design pointed to our philosophy without realizing it was your pattern by CHARLIE,. Strategic failure aggressive Action are key their staff integrate various processes within headquarters and across force...